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Abstract 
 
Using one’s success and failure experiences can be an indicator of how well risk is being 
managed in uncertain situations, particularly because exact probability information about 
outcomes is often missing. Experience-based paradigms include this more real-world aspect of a 
lack of information when studying risk taking behavior. This thesis builds upon experience-
based paradigms to include the element of skill. 
A puzzle task was developed. A goal was given to participants to try to discern a pattern in each 
puzzle that would yield consistently positive outcomes. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
high or low success rate, but told that skill played a role in performance. The outcomes 
associated with each puzzle were chosen by the participant, and served as a measure of risk 
taking. After playing 41 puzzles, participants responded to scales measuring skill and chance 
beliefs, and motivational focus. 
Risk preferences were similar to experience-based paradigm predictions, though they were not 
well-calibrated. Those with a high success rate took more risks relative to those with a low 
success rate, but the results were less extreme than predicted. In addition, a closer look revealed 
that the pattern for those with a low success rate began by increasing their risk taking, and then 
did not decrease their risk taking significantly. Neither group felt that skill or chance was playing 
a dominant role in outcomes, though self-serving bias was observed as better performance did 
lead to higher ratings of skill.  Overall, the results suggest that introducing the potential for skill 
may change how people approach risk in ways not predicted by experience-based paradigms.
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Striving for Success in an Uncertain Environment 
 
We are often faced with situations that are uncertain and that we need to somehow 
manage. Striving for success in uncertain situations provides a method for finding ways to 
control the situation. Our idea of skill is reliant on our ongoing observations of the interaction 
between uncertainty in the environment and outcomes of our attempts to be successful.  To 
succeed, we must reduce uncertainty by detecting regularities, and then use those regularities to 
predict and control outcomes. 
 This combination of striving for success and attempting to manage uncertainty in the 
environment is applicable to many different contexts, including the job market (e.g, Fugate, 
Kinicki, & Ashforth, 2004) and academic settings (e.g., Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001). Finding 
a job, for instance, requires facing an ever-changing economy. Students in an academic setting 
must handle different instructors, courses, and the transition from grade school to higher 
education. Former success, whether it is in the job market, an academic setting, or another 
context, undoubtedly influences beliefs about the role of skill which inform judgments of ability. 
In the case of finding a job, former success influences perceptions regarding the ability to acquire 
and maintain a job. Concerning school achievement, previous success influences beliefs 
regarding the ability to achieve a high grade or acquire a particular degree. 
The success of our efforts is important to our sense of skill. However, levels of success 
are actually determined by a combination of skill and uncertainty in the environment. There is 
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uncertainty in the environment whenever we are unable to determine the likelihood of possible 
outcomes. Dealing with this uncertainty while trying to succeed makes situations challenging. 
The challenge can be thought of as the attempt to control the uncertainty in the situation through 
skill. This thesis explores how people deal with challenging situations by applying their skill to 
the existing uncertainty in an attempt to succeed. Specifically, we study how general willingness 
to take risks is affected by one’s current level of success in an uncertain environment. We also 
explore how level of success and risk-taking are related to  inferences about the role of skill and 
chance, as well as tendencies to adopt a motivational focus on approaching success versus 
avoiding failure. 
Defining and Studying Risk Taking 
Risk and uncertainty go hand in hand. These concepts are studied in situations where it is 
unclear which outcome will occur. Knowing the probabilities of the outcomes is characteristic of 
a risky situation, while not knowing the probabilities of the outcomes is characteristic of an 
uncertain situation. The real world, however, does not clearly make this distinction between 
types of situations. Taking this into account, this thesis attempts to examine risk in an uncertain 
situation. What exactly “risk” means depends on who is asked. While a layperson might view 
risk as danger, psychologists and economists typically define risk as a function of variability 
(e.g., Arrow, 1965: Lopes, 1983). Variability has to do with the spread of the distribution of 
possible outcomes. The higher the variability in the situation, the greater the amount of risk. We 
will use the scientific definition of risk as variance when studying risk in uncertain situations. 
Researchers who study risky decision making often use paradigms in which the 
environment is governed completely by chance, and the probabilities associated with the options 
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are explicitly stated. One of the most common risky choice paradigms is the gambling paradigm 
(Lopes, 1983). In this paradigm, options are presented in a chance-driven environment as two-
outcome gambles with stated probabilities. Choosing the riskier of the options is classified as 
risk seeking, while choosing the safer of the options is classified as risk aversion. The gambling 
paradigm has been used as far back as Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1954), who is considered by many 
to be the father of economic utility theory. It has also been the primary paradigm used to develop 
and test prospect theory (Kahneman & Tverky, 1979), which for more than thirty years has been 
the dominant theory of risky choice in the field of judgment and decision making. While this 
paradigm has been essential to the study of risky decision making, the paradigm is not 
necessarily a good fit for every kind of risky choice. The characteristics of many real world 
environments seem qualitatively different from what is assumed in the gambling paradigm. 
For instance, people often do not have access to explicit probability information about 
options. Instead, the information they would have access to when making decisions would be 
their experiences regarding their successful and unsuccessful attempts at managing uncertainty in 
similar situations. Also, people are typically not operating in an entirely chance-driven 
environment. Instead, they are often operating in an environment in which there is the 
opportunity for skill to be effectively exerted to influence the likelihood of outcomes. This 
experiment described here is an attempt to address these two more common aspects of real world 
environments that the gambling paradigm does not capture.  
In order to do this, a puzzle task is used in which the goal is to correctly predict a pattern 
in an attempt to win prizes. The task environment is one in which there is an expectation that 
there is the potential for skill to contribute to success in identifying a pattern. At the same time, 
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there remains an element of uncertainty regarding the outcome of predictions. In lieu of exact 
probability information, experiences of success and failure at attempting to predict a pattern will 
be accessible to help gain a sense of the likelihood of various possible outcomes. Thus, this task 
will help capture two important characteristics of risk within many real world environments: (1) 
the potential for skill to help manage or reduce uncertainty and (2) the availability of information 
in the form of success and failure experiences instead of probabilities. 
Actual Success Rate and Risk Taking 
In an uncertain situation, we do not have access to exact probability information. 
Therefore, when making risky decisions, we rely on the availability of success and failure 
experiences. The series of success and failure experiences is used to infer one’s success rate. 
Success rate is one of the few pieces of information available to tell us about how well we are 
managing risk in an uncertain situation. Several different paradigms have been used to examine 
the relationship between success rate and risk taking behaviors. These different paradigms 
sometimes incorporate aspects of the gambling paradigm and in other cases attempt to map more 
closely onto more common characteristics of risk in the real world. Results suggest that success 
rate information does influence risk preferences, and that the relationship changes depending on 
the information provided to the decision maker by their task environment. These types of 
differences have been extensively explored in what has been come to be known as the 
“description-experience gap” (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009). 
Differences in risky decision making have been studied as a function of making decisions 
based on descriptions of outcomes versus direct experience with outcomes (e.g., Hertwig & 
Erev, 2009). Making decisions from description involves using direct information regarding 
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outcomes and their stated probabilities, as in the gambling paradigm. Making decisions from 
experience involves relying on feedback gained from experience with available options to learn 
about the likelihoods of outcomes.  
Decisions about probabilities based on experience have been studied for decades, most 
often in the context of multiple cue probability learning (see, e.g., Brehmer, 1980; Holzworth, 
2001). These investigations explore whether and how people learn correct probabilities for 
outcomes based on feedback.  Although these studies indicate both strengths and weaknesses in 
people’s abilities to learn from series of events, this paradigm has typically been used to study 
the accuracy of predictions rather than inclinations regarding risk-taking. 
Barron and Erev (2003) developed a task specifically designed to examine risk-taking 
tendencies when choice feedback comes from experience.  In this way, they could directly 
compare risky choice when probabilities were experienced over time versus directly supplied in 
a gambling-paradigm description.  They created experience-based risky choices using what they 
told subjects was a ‘computerized money machine.’ In this ‘computerized money machine,’ there 
are two buttons on a computer screen, each representing a different gamble. The outcomes 
corresponding to the different gambles are initially unknown to the participants. Participants 
have the opportunity to click a button and obtain an outcome from the selected gamble. The two 
gambles corresponding to the two buttons are either a risky option with two possible outcomes or 
a safe option with a single outcome. Participants make choices in one of three types of 
experience-based paradigms or in the description-based paradigm.  
The three variants of the task include what the authors call the sampling, full feedback 
and partial feedback paradigms. In the sampling paradigm, participants sample several outcomes 
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before they make a single, final choice. In the full feedback paradigm, participants continuously 
receive feedback about both obtained and foregone outcomes across multiple trials. And in the 
partial feedback paradigm, participants continuously receive feedback across trials but only 
about the obtained outcomes. In several comparisons of description and experience-based risky 
choices, Erev, Barron, and colleagues demonstrated systematic differences in preferences 
(Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev et al., 2009, Hertwig & Erev, 2009).  
In the experience-based paradigms, participants tended to be risk seeking when the more 
desirable outcome in the risk had a higher probability and tended to be risk averse when the more 
desirable outcome had a lower probability. For the description-based paradigm, participants 
generally followed the opposite pattern. Participants tended to be risk averse when the more 
desirable outcome had a higher probability and risk seeking when the more desirable outcome 
had a lower probability. Moreover, prospect theory’s famous ‘reflection effect’ was reversed in 
experience-based decisions.  The original reflection effect was documented in the gambling 
paradigm.  Preferences for gambles were found to be typically risk averse for gains but risk 
seeking when the outcomes were ‘reflected’ (about the y-axis on a graph) to become losses.  
When comparable gambles are presented in an experience-based format, the opposite pattern 
emerges, with tendencies toward risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses. These 
differences in risk preferences have been termed the ‘description-experience gap.’ 
According to Hertwig and Erev (2009), the ‘description-experience gap’ is caused by the 
way in which rare events are processed. Rare events are underweighted when making decisions 
from experience, but are overweighted when making decisions from description. This 
explanation suggests that, when decisions are made from experience, rare successes or rare 
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failures do not hold much weight when making risky decisions. This is because rare events are, 
by definition, not often experienced.  However, rare events remain salient in gambles wherein 
the probabilities are explicitly stated.  When salient, these rare events are exaggerated in 
importance. 
Research on the ‘description-experience’ gap provides insight into how acquiring 
probability information via description or experience influences risk preferences. These methods 
are particularly important when studying the relationship between success rate and risk taking. 
Decision makers can be explicitly told how well or poorly they are doing, and they can learn 
through their success and failure experiences. Below are examples of how different methods of 
acquiring probability information can influence the relationship between success rate and risk 
taking. 
In a recent study, Schneider, Stershic and Ranieri (2013) explored the effects of repeated 
good or bad outcomes on risk taking.  Specifically, they examined whether one was more likely 
to take a risk or play it safe when doing well versus poorly. Participants in this experiment saw 
hypothetical 50/50 two-outcome gambles, and were asked to make a selection about which 
gamble they preferred to play. Positive, negative and mixed experiences were created by 
changing whether all of the possible outcomes in the gamble were positive, negative or a 
mixture. The researchers found that, as participants started to have a negative experience and 
began doing poorly, they took more risks than they did before they started having the negative 
experience. Those who started to have a positive experience and began doing well took fewer 
risks than they did before they started having the positive experience. If people use experiences 
of doing well or poorly to inform them of their success rate, then these results suggest that those 
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with a higher success rate would take fewer risks, while those with a lower success rate would 
take more risks. 
Using hypothetical scenarios, Sitkin and Weingart (1995) found a different pattern of 
results.  They exposed participants to a hypothetical scenario in which they had to determine if it 
was financially viable for their race car team to compete in the last race of their season. In this 
scenario, the participants were either previously successful or unsuccessful as a result of previous 
relevant decisions. The authors found that participants who were informed that they had 
successfully made similar decisions in the past reported higher levels of risk propensity 
(tendency to take risks) than those who were informed that they were unsuccessful. In contrast to 
the Schneider et al. findings, these results suggest that those with higher success rates would take 
more risks, while those with lower success rates would take fewer risks. 
These two examples, one using a modified gambling paradigm and one using a 
hypothetical scenario, suggest conflicting risk preference patterns for higher and lower success 
rates. Sitkin and Weingart provided a description of the situation but did not give participants 
exact probability information, while Schneider and colleagues had participants experience a 
series of good or bad outcomes but did provide exact probabilities of 50/50. These differences in 
results suggest that the expression of probabilities may be critical to the description-experience 
gap.  Sitkin and Weingart’s lack of exact probability information led to a preference pattern 
similar to experience paradigms even with a description-based scenario.  In contrast, the explicit 
probabilities in Schneider et al.’s modified gambling paradigm resulted in preferences similar to 
other description paradigms, even though good and bad experiences evolved over time. 
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Work on the description-experience gap demonstrates that the way in which we obtain 
information about likelihoods will influence how we feel about taking risks.  Nevertheless, 
neither the description nor experience paradigms take into account the real-world presence of the 
element of skill in many situations involving uncertainty.  The experience-based paradigms take 
the first step to map onto real world situations in which exact probability information is not 
available. This thesis extends these paradigms in an attempt to look at situations in which skill 
has the potential to be involved. We examine not only general tendencies toward taking risks, but 
also the extent to which people come to accurately gauge how much risk to take given 
information from experience about their success rate.  In addition, because the experiences we 
are studying have the potential for skill to be involved, we also wanted to explore beliefs about 
skill and chance in performance. 
The Role of Inferences About Skill and Chance 
 Interpretation of success rate information is likely to be related to the perceived role of 
skill and chance in real-world environments. The perceived role of skill refers to beliefs about 
the extent to which one is able to impart some control over the outcomes that occur. Increases in 
skill should be associated with increases in success rate.  The perceived role of chance refers to 
the beliefs about the extent to which the outcomes that occur are randomly determined or the 
result of good or bad luck. The more that results are due to chance, the less opportunity there is 
to be able to exert skill to control the outcomes.  
Research has been done on the influence of beliefs about skill and chance in the 
interpretation of a sequence of outcomes, particularly “streaks.” A streak refers to an 
uninterrupted series, or string, of the same outcome. Examples include research on the gambler’s 
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fallacy and the hot hand effect, both of which deal with the interpretation of a streak in a 
sequence of outcomes. 
The gambler’s fallacy is the belief that a streak within a series of randomly determined 
outcomes is less likely to continue and the opposite outcome is more likely to occur. So, if a 
series of coin flips reveals a streak of several tails in a row, people will start to expect to see a 
head revealed on the next toss.  That is, they will come to believe that a head is more likely than 
a tail to be the next outcome, even though the odds are 50/50 on every trial.  This effect was first 
demonstrated by Laplace (1951), and has been demonstrated in actual bets placed at a casino 
(Croson & Sundali, 2005). Evidence was found that people bet based on belief in the gambler’s 
fallacy. After a streak of five or more of a particular outcome, people were more likely to bet 
against the streak than with the streak. 
The hot hand effect is a related but contrasting phenomenon in which people have the 
expectation that a streak of a particular outcome is likely to continue because a person is “hot.” 
Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985) demonstrated this effect within the sport of basketball. 
They found that people believed a basketball player to be more likely to score if they had already 
done so a few times in a row than if they had recently missed. The basketball player was said to 
have had a “hot hand,” and the streak of successful shots was judged to be more likely to 
continue than not. 
The difference between these effects lies in whether a streak of a particular outcome is 
expected to continue or not continue. The streak is expected to continue according to the hot 
hand effect, while the streak is not expected to continue according to the gambler’s fallacy. This 
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difference in expectation can make the effects seem contradictory, but this contradiction can be 
resolved when beliefs about skill and chance are examined. 
To better understand the gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect, Ayton and Fisher (2004) 
studied the attributions of skill and chance that people made regarding different types of 
sequences. They presented participants with three sets of binary sequences. Participants were 
told to identify whether the sequence was an output from human skill or chance performance. 
The authors found that participants were more likely to attribute sequences with more streaks to 
human skill. Sequences with fewer streaks were found to be attributed to chance. These findings 
suggest that how success rate is interpreted is related to the extent to which the sequence that 
makes up the success rate is perceived to be a result of skill or chance. If the sequence of 
outcomes is consistent, then the success rate would typically be interpreted as due to high or low 
skill. If the sequence of outcomes is variable, then the success rate would tend to be interpreted 
as due to chance. 
 In a similar vein, Burns and Corpus (2004) studied when people would be more likely to 
predict a continuation of a streak of outcomes. They found that it depended on whether the 
mechanism generating the outcomes was believed to be random or non-random. Participants in 
this experiment read a hypothetical scenario about a sequence that was said to be random or non-
random. They were then asked to choose which outcome they thought would occur next. The 
authors found that a streak was continued more often for the non-random scenarios than the 
random scenario. These findings have implications for how success rate information is 
interpreted and used. When the sequence of outcomes used to determine success rate is 
interpreted to be non-random (i.e., due to skill), a streak is thought to be more likely to continue. 
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When the sequence of outcomes used to determine success rate is interpreted to be due to 
chance, a streak is thought to be less likely to continue.  
The results of these experiments provide evidence for the role of skill and chance in 
interpretation of success rate information. Whether the success rate is interpreted as a result of 
skill or chance depends on the consistency or variability of the sequence of outcomes. Also, 
whether a streak is expected to continue depends on the extent to which it is interpreted as a 
result of skill or chance. This is important to consider when studying the relationship between 
success rate and risk taking. 
If success rate is interpreted as being due more to skill, then similar to the expectation in 
the hot hand effect, a more consistent and non-random streak would be expected to continue. The 
willingness to take a risk could increase for those experiencing a streak of successes because one 
would expect to succeed as a result of skill intervening in that risky decision. A streak of failures 
might also be expected to continue if skill did not seem enough to bring about successes. In this 
case, the willingness to take a risk could decrease because one would expect to fail and would 
therefore try to take the safest course possible. These patterns are similar to results from 
experience-based paradigms, but a difference is that hot hand research includes beliefs about 
skill as part of the rationale for the pattern. Thus, it should be possible to see differences in risk-
taking among those with equivalent success rates depending on beliefs about the role of skill. 
If success rate is interpreted as being due solely to chance, then similar to the expectation 
in the gambler’s fallacy, a less consistent and more random streak would not be expected to 
continue. A streak of successes might not be expected to continue, and the opposite outcome of 
failure would be expected. Therefore, the willingness to take a risk could decrease because one 
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would expect that failure is imminent, so minimizing losses would seem most important. A 
streak of failures might also not be expected to continue, and instead the opposite outcome of 
success would be expected. In this case, the willingness to take a risk could increase because one 
would expect that a success must be coming soon, and so going for larger potential gains would 
seem attractive. These predictions would not typically be expected, however, as the situation of 
interest is one that is believed to involve elements of both skill and chance. 
The role of skill and chance is important when making risky decisions in an uncertain 
environment, as it has implications for how likelihoods and streaks of outcomes are interpreted 
and used. Related to the expectation in the hot hand effect that streaks are more likely to 
continue, we conduct exploratory analyses to see if patterns of risk taking varied as a function of 
beliefs about skill independent of success rate. We also examine beliefs about skill and chance to 
see if they differ as a function of success rate. We base our predictions on the well-known self-
serving bias (e.g., Heider, 1958; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Self-serving bias is a 
phenomenon in which attributions made after experiencing success are different than ones made 
after experiencing failure. In an effort for people to enhance or protect their self-concept, 
experiencing success is often attributed to themselves and something they did (e.g., used their 
skill), while experiencing failure is attributed to the environment (e.g., chance). Exploratory 
analyses were also conducted to see whether motivational focus varied depending on success 
rate. 
Exploring the Role of Motivational Focus 
It is common knowledge that there exist fundamental motivations to approach pleasure 
and avoid pain. By the same token, we are motivated to approach success and avoid failure. 
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Research suggests that, not only do these motivations exist, but there are individual differences 
in which motivation tends to predominate. Instead of looking at individual differences in 
motivational focus, this thesis will explore whether experiencing a high or low success rate can 
direct one’s motivations towards approaching the positive versus avoiding the negative. 
Atkinson’s (1957) theory of the motivation to achieve success versus avoid failure 
focused on situations that involve some skill and some chance. Atkinson demonstrated that there 
are individual differences in types of task chosen and willingness to take on risks, depending on 
the stronger motivational focus. He found that those who had a stronger motive to achieve 
success were willing to take on a moderate amount of risk. Those who had a stronger motive to 
avoid failure were willing to take on either extremely high (self-handicapping) or extremely low 
(ensured success) amounts of risk.  
Lopes (1983) also described motivational differences, but in the context of purely chance 
events.  SP/A theory is a two factor theory of risky choice that includes a dispositional factor that 
disposes people towards choosing to take a risk or to play it safe. Lopes proposed a motivational 
continuum in which people were predominantly motivated by security concerns or by desires for 
potential. Security-oriented individuals are motivated to avoid the worst outcomes in risky 
situations, whereas potential-oriented individuals are motivated to obtain the greatest benefit in 
risky situations.  
Additionally, Crowe and Higgins (1997) demonstrated motivational focus differences in 
a memory task. They found that those with an induced promotion focus to pursue positive 
outcomes were more concerned with getting hits (correctly recognizing previously presented 
words), and therefore had a riskier bias of saying ‘yes’ for recognition of words. Those with an 
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induced prevention focus to avoid negative outcomes were more concerned with getting correct 
rejections (correctly avoiding words that were not previously presented), and therefore had a 
conservative bias of saying ‘no’ for recognition of words. 
Potential differences in motivational focus seem especially relevant when making risky 
decisions in an uncertain environment that involves skill. Although motivational focus regarding 
approaching success and avoiding failure are typically studied as individual differences, we 
hypothesized that differences in motivational focus may also occur due to experience and would 
be in line with experience-based paradigm predictions. When predominately experiencing 
successes, one may come to expect them based on skill, and therefore be more motivated to 
approach the positive, and take a risk. Taking the risk might be seen as worth it given that you 
can exert skill in order to possibly succeed as a result. When predominately experiencing 
failures, one may become more concerned about the inability to exert skill to avoid failures, 
making it more appealing to play it safe. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore how people deal with challenging situations by 
attempting to apply their skill to the existing uncertainty to increase their likelihood to succeed. 
Specifically, this thesis examined how general willingness to take on risk is affected by one’s 
current success rate in an uncertain environment that ostensibly involves skill. If success rate 
information is used in lieu of exact probabilities when making risky decisions, then different 
success rates are likely to elicit different risk preferences. In addition, the role of inferences 
about skill and chance, and differences in motivational focus are explored, as these may be 
related to reactions to different success rates. 
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Success rate and risk taking: General test of experience-based paradigm 
predictions. Overall, success rate was expected to influence the willingness to take on more or 
less risk. It was hypothesized that a low success rate would lead to a reduced willingness to take 
on risk. A high success rate was expected to lead to a greater willingness to take on risk. This 
pattern is consistent with experience-based paradigm predictions (e.g., Hertwig & Erev, 2009). 
This was expected because participants are not given explicit probability information and instead 
have to experience their successes and failures, similar to experience-based paradigms. 
Success rate and risk taking: More stringent test of experience-based paradigm 
predictions. Additionally, how well people are calibrated in their risk taking based on their 
success rate was also of interest because it was a way of measuring how well people responded 
to success rate information. This is a more stringent test of the experience-based paradigm 
predictions. We expected those with a lower success rate to take on a lower level of risk 
compared to their optimal level of risk. In other words, they would be more risk averse than what 
would be optimal. This is because they are expected to underestimate the likelihood of positive 
outcomes because they are relatively rare. For those with a high success rate, the opposite pattern 
is predicted by the experience-based paradigm. They are expected to take on a higher level of 
risk compared to their optimal level. This is because, for them, the relatively rare events are the 
negative outcomes. If they underestimate the negative outcomes, they should be overconfident 
and relatively risk seeking. 
If results go against our predictions, the description-based paradigm may provide a better 
fit.  If this happens, results may be more consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) predictions. Prospect theory predicts the overestimation of relatively rare events, so that 
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those with a low success rate are expected to overshoot their optimal level of risk and be 
relatively more risk seeking, while those with a high success rate should be relatively risk averse 
and undershoot their optimal level of risk. If these are the results, then it suggests that something 
other than explicit probability information may bring about the prospect theory predicted pattern. 
Beliefs about skill and chance: Predictions related to hot hand. The role of inferences 
about skill and chance was studied in a more exploratory manner. If participants tend to attribute 
their performance to skill, then similar to the expectation in the hot hand effect, streaks would be 
expected to continue. With a high success rate, those who attribute their performance primarily 
to skill should take on more risk than they otherwise would because they expect their good 
performance to continue.  With a low success rate, the opposite pattern is expected, in which 
attributions of skill lead to risk aversion for fear that bad performance will continue. If chance is 
seen as having a primary or the only role in performance, then similar to the expectation in the 
gambler’s fallacy, streaks would not be expected to continue. Risk preference patterns opposite 
of those mentioned above would be predicted. Because we designed the task to appear to involve 
skill, these results would be unexpected. 
Beliefs about skill and chance: Test of self-serving bias. We also explored overall 
differences in attributions of skill and chance as a function of success rate. For both conditions, it 
was expected that performance would be attributed more to skill than chance, particularly 
because skill is explained and reinforced as a factor in performance. Nevertheless, those with a 
high success rate are apt to believe that skill had more of a role in their performance than those 
with a low success rate. Those with a high success rate are also expected to believe that chance 
had less of a role in their performance than those with a low success rate. This is consistent with 
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self-serving bias, in which people tend to attribute their successes to themselves and their failures 
to their environment (e.g., Heider, 1958; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). 
Motivational focus. Finally, we explored whether success rate is likely to influence 
motivational focus. Experiencing a lower success rate might focus attention on avoiding failure, 
so that one might be more apt to play it safe in order not to lose. Experiencing a higher success 
rate might focus attention on approaching success, so that one might be more willing to take a 
risk in order to succeed.  These differences in motivational focus would be consistent with 
experience-based predictions of tendencies to underweight the rarer event, and might suggest an 
underlying role for motivation in the direction of attention (or vice versa). 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 Two hundred and three participants were recruited for this experiment and earned 
psychology course extra credit for their participation. Although demographic information was 
not collected, the research population was likely to be consistent with undergraduate psychology 
majors, the majority of whom are female and between 18-24 years old. 
 An online system used by the psychology department (SONA) identified and recruited 
the potential participants. For individuals to be enrolled in the experiment, they had to be at least 
18 years old and eligible to access the online system. 
Materials and Stimuli 
The entire experiment was conducted in a computer lab setting equipped with 11 desktop 
computers. This allowed multiple people to participate in the experiment at the same time. The 
experimental manipulation of success rate used a puzzle task in which the goal of the participant 
was to try, through repeated button clicks, to discern a pattern that yielded consistently positive 
outcomes. 
At any given time, one puzzle was displayed on the computer screen. Figure 1 provides a 
sample of a puzzle before any button has been selected. 
 Figure 1. An example of the outset of the puzzle task
that a participant would see when start
chosen Win/Loss Combo 1, displayed
above the puzzle, which at the outset of each new puzzle was
corner indicates that there were 10 
new puzzle. 
Each puzzle consisted of 36 square buttons in a 6 x 6 square grid. There were three 
characteristics of each button that distinguished it from the other buttons in the puzzle
color, symbol, and symbol size.  Button colors, symbols, and symb
highly distinctive within each puzzle. Nine sets of button colors and 9 sets of distinct button 
symbols were randomly distributed across puzzles.
To play the puzzle, the participant clicked on a button to reveal the point outcome
the button.  After a click, an outcome appeared, and was incorporated into a ‘Current Total’ for 
that puzzle trial. The outcome was either a positive ‘winning’ value or a negative ‘losing’ value. 
On the next click, the previous outcome disappeared 
currently clicked button revealed the next outcome, and so on, until the participant had clicked 
10 of the 36 buttons. The number of clicks remaining (‘Clicks Remaining’) out of 10 was 
available throughout the puzzle t
zero, play on that particular puzzle was over, completing that puzzle trial. For an example a 
puzzle with three clicked buttons, see Figure 2.
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. This figure illustrates a possible screen 
ing a new 6 x 6 puzzle. In this example, the participant had 
 in the upper left corner. The Current Total was displayed 
 zero. The number in the upper right 
clicks remaining as was always the case at the outset of each 
ol sizes were chosen to be 
 
leaving a blank gray space, while the 
rial on the computer screen. Once the number of clicks equaled 
 
—button 
 behind 
 Figure 2. An example of a puzzle with three clicked buttons.
puzzle from Figure 1, but after three
the square went from colored to gray. The most recently clicked button
and was added onto the Current Total 
The outcomes associated with each puzzle were determined by a previously chosen 
win/loss combo. There were 9 win/loss combos available, labeled Win/Loss Combo 1 through 
Win/Loss Combo 9. Each combo was similar to a two
associated ‘winning’ value and ‘losing’ value. As the win/loss combo 
extremeness of the positive and negative outcomes increased. Decisions had to be made between
safer levels with small gains but small or zero losses, and riskier levels wit
but large potential losses. For an example of the win/loss combo selection screen, see Figure 3.
Figure 3. An example of the win/loss combo selection 
win/loss combo for the next two 
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 This figure illustrates the same 
 buttons had been clicked. A button had been clicked when 
 shows a value of five
to increase it from zero to five. 
-outcome gamble, in that there was an 
level increased, the 
h large potential gains 
 
screen. This screen was used to select the
puzzles. The winning and losing values listed would be
, 
 
 
 
 the 
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outcomes for clicks in the next two puzzles. After every two puzzles, participants saw this screen 
again and had the opportunity to choose the same or a different win/loss combo. 
Each combo had an associated expected value (EV) for one click, depending on the 
chosen win/loss combo and the manipulated success rate.  Table 1 below presents this 
information. 
Table 1. The Expected Value of One Button Click Based on Win/Loss Combo and Success Rate 
 
The combo information on the left side of Table 1 outlines the win/loss combo number 
and the associated winning and losing values. The participant had access to this information from 
their win/loss combo selection screen (see Figure 3), but did not have direct access to the 
expected value information on the right of Table 1. The expected values in the righthand 
columns list the average winnings expected for one click of a button depending on the success 
rate. For instance, a participant with an assigned low success rate might have chosen Win/Loss 
Combo 2. If they did so, they would win 2.663 points for each button click on average. This does 
not mean that they would actually win 2.663 points, as they would either win 10 points or lose 1 
point. Instead, the 2.663 points refers to what they would win if they clicked a random button 
Low High
 
12 out of 36 
buttons
24 out of 36 
buttons
0.333 0.667
Win/Loss Combo Winning Value Losing Value
1 5 0 1.665 3.335
2 10 -1 2.663 6.337
3 15 -3 2.994 9.006
4 20 -6 2.658 11.342
5 25 -10 1.655 13.345
6 30 -15 -0.015 15.015
7 35 -21 -2.352 16.352
8 40 -35 -10.025 15.025
9 45 -50 -18.365 13.365
Success Rate
Seen by participants Not seen by participants
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repeatedly over the long run   .33310
  .6671
. The highlighted expected values in 
the table show the combos that would result in achieving the highest expected values in each 
condition. The dark gray highlighting indicates the largest expected value and therefore the 
optimal win/loss combo for each success rate. If participants were calibrating their chosen combo 
to their success rate, they would ultimately select the combo that afforded them the dark gray-
highlighted expected values, as these optimal win/loss combos would be expected to earn the 
most points. For high success rate participants, the optimal win/loss combo was Combo 7, while 
for low success rate participants, the optimal win/loss combo was Combo 3. 
Design 
 The primary independent variable was a between-subjects manipulation of success rate, 
with participants randomly assigned to one of two levels. Success rate refers to the likelihood 
that the participant would get the winning value when they clicked on one button in the puzzle. 
The two levels of the success rate variable were low and high. This was achieved using a success 
rate of 33% (12 winning outcomes out of 36 buttons) and 67% (24 winning outcomes out of 36 
buttons), respectively. 
 The primary dependent variable of interest was risk taking. Risk-taking behaviors were 
measured by the chosen win/loss combos. As the win/loss combos increase, risk increases.  The 
higher the combo selected, the greater the willingness to take risk. In addition, items regarding 
skill, chance, and motivational focus were assessed in an exploratory manner. Satisfaction with 
performance and decision strategy were also assessed as a manipulation check, in that those with 
a high success rate should be more satisfied with their performance and decision strategy than 
those with a low success rate. The five ratings scales are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Five Scale Endpoints Used to Measure Attributions, Satisfaction and Motivational 
Focus 
 
Each of the five scales consisted of four items. Each item included possible ratings using 
7 radial buttons, with the two sentences serving as opposite endpoints. Ratings were then coded 
as -3 to 3, to indicate going from the negative to the positive end of the scale. The four scales 
measuring attributions of skill and chance and satisfaction with performance and decision 
strategy were modified from those used in the Judgment and Decision Making lab, which are 
high in face validity. The fifth scale measured motivations to approach success versus avoid 
failure. These motivational focus items were modified from the promotion/prevention scale to be 
specific to the puzzle task (Lockwood, Jordan & Kunda, 2002, see also Summerville & Roese, 
2008). A random sequence of all twenty items was created. Half of the items in each subscale 
had the negative end of the scale on the left, while the other half had the negative end of the scale 
on the right. 
Construct Negative End of Scale Positive End of Scale
Skill My current total was not due to my skill. My current total was due to my skill.
Skill My skill had no influence over my performance. My skill had substantial influence over my performance.
Skill My skill is not responsible for how much I won or lost. My skill is responsible for how much I won or lost.
Skill My skill had nothing to do with my scores. My skill had everything to do with my scores. 
Chance/Luck I feel that the odds were against me. I feel that the odds were in my favor.
Chance/Luck I was unlucky in my puzzle outcomes. I was lucky in my puzzle outcomes.
Chance/Luck Overall I was unlucky. Overall I was lucky.
Chance/Luck I feel that my scores were due to bad luck. I feel my scores were due to good luck.
Performance Satisfaction I feel like I did not do well. I feel like I did well.
Performance Satisfaction I feel like I could have done better. I do not feel like I could have done better.
Performance Satisfaction I expected to do better. I expected to do worse.
Performance Satisfaction I am not satisfied with my score. I am satisfied with my score.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I am disappointed in my decision strategy. I am proud of my decision strategy.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I am not happy with my decision strategy. I am happy with my decision strategy.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction My decision strategy was not effective. My decision strategy was effective.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I feel bad about my decision strategy. I feel good about my decision strategy.
Success/Failure Focus I was focused on avoiding negative outcomes. I was focused on achieving positive outcomes.
Success/Failure Focus In this task, I mostly thought about potential failure. In this task, I mostly thought about potential success.
Success/Failure Focus I saw myself as striving to prevent poor performance. I saw myself as striving to achieve good performance.
Success/Failure Focus Mostly I imagined myself making bad puzzle button selections. Mostly I imagined myself making good puzzle button selections.
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Procedure 
 Participants played through 41 different puzzles in the experiment. Each of these puzzles 
had the same underlying success rate, depending on the assigned condition. The first 10 puzzles 
were termed the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles. This stage was used to create the illusion of the potential 
for skill to be involved. The next 30 puzzles were termed the ‘Calibration’ puzzles. This stage 
was used to create the opportunity for participants to calibrate their success to their environment. 
Afterwards, there was one final puzzle termed the ‘Prize Round’ puzzle. It served solely as a 
motivational tool for the participants to continue to pay attention while playing the puzzles. 
Although participants were told that their performance in this ‘Prize Round’ would determine the 
kind of prize they would receive, all participants received the same small prize no matter their 
performance. 
Participants had the opportunity to choose a win/loss combo after every two puzzles had 
been completed, as well as for the ‘Prize Round’ puzzle, for a total of 21 choices. The first 5 
choices were in the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, the next 15 win/loss combo selections were in the 
‘Calibration’ puzzles, and the final time a win/loss combo was chosen was for the ‘Prize Round.’ 
Having participants choose win/loss combos throughout the experiment allowed for eventual 
analyses of risk taking over time—across ‘Initial Skill’ and ‘Calibration’ stages, as well as 
combo selections early and late within the stages. Details about the step-by-step procedure are 
outlined below. 
Participants came into the laboratory and had free choice in seating. Once the session 
started, instructions were read and three practice puzzles were shown to the participants. Along 
with other information, participants were told that the purpose of this experiment was to measure 
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“people’s general, intuitive ability to pattern match.” They were also told that rules existed that, 
if followed, would “help them get the winning values most of the time” and obtain a higher point 
total in the end. It was explained that “more points meant a better prize,” but no other specifics 
about the point totals and prizes were given. The first practice puzzle was used to demonstrate 
the task, and how different patterns could lead to a higher point total and better prize at the end 
of the experiment. Before the final two practice puzzles, win/loss combo levels were explained. 
Win/Loss Combo 1 and Win/Loss Combo 9 were used for the demonstration. In an attempt to 
minimize possible order effects of anchoring, sessions were randomly assigned to instructions 
that explained the practice puzzle with Win/Loss Combo 1 first or Win/Loss Combo 9 first. The 
final two practice puzzles were used to demonstrate how a chosen win/loss combo level 
determined the possible outcomes in the puzzle. 
Participants then began the self-administered part of the session, always experiencing 
their assigned success rate and selecting a new win/loss combo after every two puzzles were 
played. They first played through the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles. Participants were then informed of 
their purported skill level based on their performance in those 10 puzzles. In reality, participants 
were given one of two messages, depending on their assigned success rate. Those in the low 
success rate group were told that they were slightly below average in skill compared to others 
who had completed the experiment. Those in the high success rate group were told that they 
were above average in skill compared to others who had participated in the experiment. This 
information was consistent with the participant’s actual experienced performance during the 
manipulated ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles. Participants then played through the ‘Calibration’ puzzles. 
After the 30 ‘Calibration’ puzzles, the participants responded to the five exploratory scales. 
Finally, the participants played the puzzle in the ‘Prize Round’. 
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 Once the self-administered part of the session was finished, the computer informed the 
participant that the experiment had ended. They were then instructed to see the experimenter for 
a debriefing sheet. At that time, they were given a small prize for completing the experiment. 
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Results 
 
 Analyses were conducted to examine how success rate influenced risk taking behaviors, 
beliefs about skill and chance, and motivational focus, as well as whether risk taking patterns 
were calibrated to optimal outcome levels. Dependent measures included risk taking behaviors as 
indicated by selected win/loss combos as well as scores on the five exploratory scales to 
represent related attributions, satisfaction, and motivational focus. 
Risk Taking 
Success rate and risk taking. The influence of success rate on risk taking was examined 
by analyzing the average of the two win/loss combos chosen at the beginning and end of the 
‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, as well as the beginning and end of the ‘Calibration’ puzzles. Specifically, 
a 2 x 2 x 2 Success Rate x Stage x Segment mixed ANOVA was conducted. Success rate was the 
between-subjects variable, and consisted of high or low success rate. Stage and Segment were 
within-subjects variables. Stage referred to the ‘Initial Skill’ and ‘Calibration’ puzzles, and 
Segment referred to the early (beginning) and late (end) selections. The dependent variable was 
risk taking, measured by the average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections. Taking the 
average of two win/loss combos was done in an attempt to get a more reliable measure without 
averaging over too many trials and thus inadvertently averaging over the effects of learning.  
In accordance with experience-based paradigm predictions, it was hypothesized that 
participants would be sensitive to their success rate, such that those with a high success rate 
would take more risks than those with a low success rate. It was assumed that at the beginning of 
29 
 
the ‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, participants in both conditions would start by choosing intermediate 
win/loss combos and avoid the extremes, since they had not yet experienced their success rate. 
By the end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage and the beginning of the ‘Calibration’ stage, participants 
had their initial experience of doing well or poorly, so those who had a low success rate were 
expected to begin to take fewer risks than those with a high success rate. By the last two win/loss 
combo selections of the ‘Calibration’ puzzles, participants had had plenty of opportunities to 
learn and experience their success rate. Provided that participants were in fact sensitive to their 
success rate, significant differences in risk taking by the end were anticipated. Those with a low 
success rate were then expected to decrease their risk taking even further and choose lower 
win/loss combos, while those with a high success rate were expected to increase their risk taking 
even further and choose higher win/loss combos. 
 As expected, there was a significant main effect of success rate, F(1,201)=21.60, p<.001, 
partial η²=.097, with those who had a high success rate taking more risks overall (4.74, SE=.14) 
than those who had a low success rate (3.81, SE=.14).  Additionally, there were significant main 
effects for stage, F(1,201)=61.94, p<001, partial η²=.24, and segment, F(1,201)=95.41, p<.001, 
partial η²=.32. In both cases, more risks were taken in the later portions of the experiment. More 
risks were taken overall in the ‘Calibration’ stage (4.74, SE=.12) than in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage 
(3.81, SE=.11). Also, more risks were taken on average in late selections (4.72, SE=.12) than in 
early selections (3.83, SE=.10). 
Both stage and segment interacted with success rate to influence risk taking. The Success 
Rate x Stage interaction, F(1,201)=41.90, p<.001, partial η²=.17, is shown in Figure 4. In the 
‘Initial Skill’ puzzles, participants in both success rate conditions were fairly conservative and 
 took on roughly the same amount of risk. Differences in risk taking between succ
arose in the ‘Calibration’ puzzles, such that those with a high success rate took on more risk than 
those with a low success rate. The change was primarily due to an increase in risk taking by the 
high success group; those with a low success rate did 
they started at a relatively low combo level and stayed there
Figure 4. Success Rate (SR) x Stage 
average of two adjacent win/loss combo
average win/loss combo, the more risk taken. 
bars are displayed. 
As shown in Figure 5, success rate also significantly interacted with segment to influence 
risk taking, F(1,201)=33.52, p<.001, partial 
interaction, in the early selections
combo selections. Differences in risk taking were more pronounced in the late selections
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not change their risk taking 
. 
interaction for risk taking. Risk taking was measured by the 
 selections (Average Win/Loss Combo). The higher the 
Results are averaged over segment. 
η²=.14. Similar to the Success Rate x Stage 
 of a stage, both groups were conservative in their win/loss 
ess rate groups 
appreciably as 
 
Standard error 
 of a 
 stage, such that those with a high success rate
success rate. Again, low success rate participants did not change their
late selections as much as high success rate participants.
Figure 5. Success Rate (SR) x Segment 
the average of the first and last two win/loss combo selections in a stage, respectively. Risk 
taking was measured by the average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections (Average 
Win/Loss Combo). The higher the average win
averaged over stage. Standard error bars are displayed.
Stage significantly interacted with segment, 
seen in Figure 6. The bigger differences in risk taking are seen between early and late selections 
in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, such that more risks are taken later in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage than 
early. There are little to no differences in risk taking between early and late sele
‘Calibration’ stage. This suggests that participants, regardless of success rate, 
taking between early and late selections in
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 took on even more risk than those with a low 
 risk taking from early to 
 
interaction on risk taking. Early and late selections refer 
/loss combo, the more risk taken. 
 
F(1,201)=35.44, p<.001, partial 
ctions in the 
adjusted their risk 
 the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, with a shift towards risk 
 
Results are 
η²=.15, as 
 seeking. Participants then did not signific
selections of ‘Calibration’ stage. 
Figure 6. Stage x Segment interaction
of the first and last two win/loss combo selections in a stage, respectively. Risk taking was 
measured by the average of two adjacent win/loss combo selections (Average Win/Loss Combo). 
The higher the average win/loss combo, the more risk taken. Results are averaged over success 
rate. Standard error bars are displayed.
The patterns seen in these two
participants would be sensitive to their success rate. 
selections, participants had little or no experience with their success rate, and differences 
between success rate groups in risk taking were minimal or non
risk taking were made within the ‘Initial Skill’ stage
success rate, and less were made 
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antly adjust much further within early and late 
 
 on risk taking. Early and late selections refer the average 
  
-way interactions are in line with our expectations that 
When making the first two win/loss combo 
-existent. More a
 as participants began to experience their 
in the ‘Calibration’ stage as participants had plenty of 
 
djustments in 
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opportunities to learn about their success rate by that point. This was especially true for those in 
the high success rate.  It also seems that those in the low success rate may have experimented 
with more risky combos early on but then gradually returned to safer levels.  As the experiment 
progressed and participants had those opportunities to learn about their success rate, differences 
in risk taking between conditions became more pronounced. 
The patterns are in accordance with general experience-based paradigm predictions. As 
predicted by experience-based paradigm research, those with a high success rate eventually took 
more risks compared to those with a low success rate. The Success Rate x Stage x Segment 
interaction was not significant, F<1.  
Success rate calibration of risk taking. Sensitivity to success rates was clearly observed 
in the primary analysis, but we wanted to know how well participants used their experienced 
success rate information to make the best risky decisions. To measure how well participants used 
this information, a single-sample t-test was conducted for each success rate group. The t-test 
compared the average of the last two win/loss combos selected to the optimal win/loss combo for 
that success rate. Reaching the optimal level would indicate that success rate information was 
used well, and that participants appropriately calibrated at least on average. This was a more 
rigorous test of experience-based paradigm predictions of the underweighting of rare events as 
the underlying rationale for the pattern. If results are consistent, then those with a low success 
rate should have a lower average win/loss combo compared to their optimal, as they would 
underestimate the rare event of doing well. Those with a high success rate should have a higher 
average win/loss combo compared to their optimal, as they would underestimate the rare event of 
doing poorly. 
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 The average of the last two win/loss combos in the ‘Calibration’ stage was found to be 
significantly different than the optimal win/loss combo for both high and low success rate groups 
bu tin the wrong direction. Those with a low success rate had an average win/loss combo of 3.77 
(SD=1.79) which was above their optimal win/loss combo of three, t(101)=4.37, p<.001, d=.60. 
Those with a high success rate had an average win/loss combo of 6.02 (SD=2.12) which was 
below their optimal win/loss combo of seven, t(100)=4.61, p<.001, d=-.65. 
These results suggest that participants were sensitive to their success rate, and eventually 
gravitated in the appropriate direction towards their optimal win/loss combo, but failed to 
calibrate completely. Participants ended up closer to the middle when selecting win/loss combos. 
Unlike our predictions, the pattern of risk taking was not consistent with experience-based 
paradigm predictions. Those with a low success rate took relatively more risks than optimal, and 
those with a high success rate had a lower average win/loss combo compared to their optimal. 
Secondary analyses of risk taking patterns. First, an analysis was done to determine 
whether the randomly assigned combo levels in the instructions had any influence on the 
relationship between success rate and risk taking. Furthermore, the average win/loss combo 
selection made by those with a high or low success rate was plotted for each trial in order to 
better understand and visualize how risk taking changed over time. 
 In an attempt to balance out the ordering effects of anchoring that could arise due to 
explaining the win/loss combo examples using Combos 1 and 9 during instructions, the order of 
their use had been randomly counterbalanced to each experimental session. A 2 x 2 Success Rate 
x Instruction Order between-subjects ANOVA was conducted in order to determine if the 
instructions had an influence on risk taking. Instruction order referred to the experimenter 
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explaining the practice puzzle with Win/Loss Combo 1 then 9 or Win/Loss Combo 9 then 1. The 
dependent variable was the average of the first 2 win/loss combo selections made in the ‘Initial 
Skill’ puzzles. This was the chosen dependent variable because any effects of instructions would 
most likely be of influence closer to when instructions were given, i.e., in the early win/loss 
combo selections. No influence of instructions was found. The main effect of instructions was 
not significant, F<1, indicating that risk taking did not differ as a function of instruction order. 
Additionally, the Success Rate x Instruction Order interaction was not significant, F<1, 
suggesting that the relationship between success rate and risk taking was not influenced by the 
instructions. 
 Figure 7 depicts the win/loss combos selected over time by each success rate group. 
Participants were able to discern quickly how well or poorly they were doing, as there were 
already differences between the groups in average win/loss combos chosen between the 
beginning and end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage (trial 5). Those with a high success rate started to 
increase their risk taking, as predicted. Those with a low success rate also significantly started to 
increase their risk taking between the beginning and end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, t(101)=-5.21, 
p<.001, d=-.52, which was not expected. Instead of responding to their success rate by 
immediately taking fewer risks in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, low success rate participants opted to 
choose higher win/loss combos, potentially because they were still exploring or thought they 
could improve their skill. However, by the end of the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, low success rate 
participants took fewer risks relative to high success rate participants, t(201)=2.42, p<.05, d=.34. 
These relative differences became more pronounced after receiving the message about purported 
skill level between the ‘Initial Skill’ and ‘Calibration’ stages (between trial 5 and 6).  
  
Figure 7. Risks taken over time by success rate group. Each point corresponds to the average 
win/loss combo selection by success rate group for each trial (once every two puzzles). The 
higher the average win/loss combo, the more risk taken. Vertical lines show separation 
stages. Trials 1 through 5 are in the Initial Skill stage. The skill message was delivered between 
Trial 5 and 6. Trials 6 through 20 are in the Calibration stage. Trial 21 refers to the win/loss 
combo chosen for the Prize Round puzzle. Horizontal 
Seven is the optimal for the high success rate group, three for the low success rate group.
As seen in Figure 7, as time passed and more puzzles were played, those with a high 
success rate gradually took more ris
20), 54% of participants were still relatively risk averse on average compared to their optimal 
win/loss combo of seven. Nevertheless, another 33% 
compared to their optimal win/loss combo, and 13% took on their optimal amount of risk. 
there was considerable variability in risk taking even at the end of 20 trials.  
Those with a low success rate 
taking in the initial stage, but then gradually drifted toward taking 
of the participants were still relatively risk seeking on average compared to their optimal 
win/loss combo of three. Another 28% 
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lines refer to the optimal win/loss combos. 
ks. However, by the last trial in the ‘Calibration’ stage (trial 
were relatively risk seeking on average 
 
started at a low combo and gradually increased their risk 
fewer risks. B
were relatively risk averse on average, and 15% took on 
between 
 
Thus, 
y Trial 20, 57% 
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their optimal amount of risk.  Again, there were noticeable individual differences in the selection 
of final risk levels, though as a group risk taking had drifted in a more conservative direction 
relative to those with the high success rate. 
Exploratory Analyses Regarding Satisfaction, Attributions and Motivational Focus 
Satisfaction with decision strategy and overall performance, and attributions regarding 
the role of skill and chance were examined along with motivational focus.  These were measured 
using five four-item scales, and were included as exploratory dependent variables of interest. 
Scores were reverse-coded when necessary to ensure that a higher score indicated a move 
towards the positive end of the scale. Final score ranges can be seen in Table 3. The score range 
remained -3 to 3 for all scales except skill. Skill was re-coded to a range of 0 to 3 in order to 
better represent the opposite ends of the scale—beliefs that no skill was involved to beliefs that 
skill was especially involved. 
Before combining the items, they were tested for reliability. Table 3 lists the items used 
in subsequent analyses and the final reliability. The skill and decision strategy satisfaction scales 
maintained each of their four original items. The performance satisfaction and chance/luck scales 
each had one of their original items removed to achieve optimal reliability. Reliability on these 
four adjusted scales were all in excess of .75 and were deemed acceptable. The success/failure 
focus scale, however, did not achieve acceptable reliability, α=.57.  
In an attempt to take a cursory look at motivational focus since the success/failure scale 
did not achieve acceptable reliability, an independent samples t-test was conducted to see if there 
were any differences between success rates in average scores on one item from the scale. The 
item used was “I was focused on avoiding negative outcomes/achieving positive outcomes.” It 
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was used because it was most closely aligned to motivational focus. No significant differences 
on this item were found between the two success rate conditions, t(201)=-1.15, p=.25. High and 
low success rate participants had an average score of .52 and .85, respectively, indicating that 
participants in both success rate groups had a slight tendency to focus more on achieving positive 
outcomes. Thus, we have no evidence for our hypothesis that motivational focus would differ 
based on success rate.  Due to the lack of reliability of the subscale and no differences found in a 
crucial item, motivational focus was not included in the remaining analyses.  
Table 3. Final Scale Items Used in Analyses with α and Score Ranges 
 
Note. Skill was re-coded as 0 to 3 to better represent the items at the end of the scale. 
Chance/luck and performance satisfaction scales each had an item removed to achieve optimal 
reliability. The success/failure focus scale is not present in this table because acceptable 
reliability was not achieved. 
Satisfaction with performance and decision strategy. Ratings of satisfaction with 
performance and decision strategy were used as a manipulation check. Those with a high success 
rate should be more satisfied with their performance and decision strategy than those with a low 
success rate, because they were generally doing well in the task. T-tests were conducted for both 
of these scales in order to see whether there were the expected differences in ratings between 
success rate groups. 
Construct Negative End of Scale Positive End of Scale α Score Range
Skill My current total was not due to my skill. My current total was due to my skill.
Skill My skill had no influence over my performance. My skill had substantial influence over my performance.
Skill My skill is not responsible for how much I won or lost. My skill is responsible for how much I won or lost.
Skill My skill had nothing to do with my scores. My skill had everything to do with my scores. 
Chance/Luck I was unlucky in my puzzle outcomes. I was lucky in my puzzle outcomes.
Chance/Luck Overall I was unlucky. Overall I was lucky.
Chance/Luck I feel that my scores were due to bad luck. I feel my scores were due to good luck.
Performance Satisfaction I feel like I did not do well. I feel like I did well.
Performance Satisfaction I expected to do better. I expected to do worse.
Performance Satisfaction I am not satisfied with my score. I am satisfied with my score.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I am disappointed in my decision strategy. I am proud of my decision strategy.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I am not happy with my decision strategy. I am happy with my decision strategy.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction My decision strategy was not effective. My decision strategy was effective.
Decision Strategy Satisfaction I feel bad about my decision strategy. I feel good about my decision strategy.
0.79 0 to 3
0.75
0.79
0.83
-3 to 3
-3 to 3
-3 to 3
 Figure 8 shows the satisfaction results. In line with our 
success rate were more satisfied with their performance, 
strategy, t(201)=10.81, p<.001, than those with a low success rate. 
associated with negative ratings of performance as expected.  
success rate were not particularly satisfied in general, suggesting that something other than doing 
well was affecting satisfaction, or that their aspirations for success were higher than the 67% 
they were achieving. Thus, our manipulation check was effective
weakly effective in an absolute sense
 
Figure 8. Ratings of satisfaction with 
(SR). The average satisfaction rating was the average of the scores on the corresponding final 
scale items. Ratings were from -3
displayed. 
The role of skill and chance
skill and chance, chance/luck scores were re
High SR 
Performance
Low SR
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predictions, those with a high 
t(201)=13.94, p<.001, and their decision 
Low success rate was 
However, those with a high 
 in a relative sense but only 
. 
performance and decision strategy for each success r
 (very dissatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied). Standard error 
. Before any analyses were conducted regarding the role of 
-coded from a scale of -3 (bad luck) to +3 (good 
High SR 
 
Decision Strategy 
 Low SR 
 
ate 
bars are 
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luck) to a scale of 0 to 3 so they could attempt to be compared to skill scores. Zero referred to 
beliefs that chance did not play a role in performance, and three referred to beliefs that chance 
had a lot to do with performance (irrespective of whether the influence was good or bad). This 
was similar for the skill scale, in which zero referred to beliefs that skill did not play a role in 
performance, and three referred to beliefs that skill played a significant role in performance. Due 
to the re-coding of skill and chance/luck, it is possible that the scores are not entirely 
comparable, as one full step in skill is actually a half step after the re-coding. For the purpose of 
exploratory analyses, comparability was tentatively assumed. 
One set of exploratory analyses consisted of a t-test comparing each success rate group in 
order to examine overall differences in attributions of skill and chance. Results were somewhat 
in accordance with our predictions, and can be seen in Figure 9. Skill was believed to play more 
of a role in performance than chance in the high success rate group only, t(100)=7.46, p<.001, as 
their skill ratings were significantly higher than chance ratings. The differences between skill and 
chance ratings in the low success rate group were not significant, t(101)=.95, n.s., suggesting that 
participants did not believe skill or chance to play more of a role than the other in performance. 
In a test of the self-serving bias, we compared attributions regarding skill and chance 
across success rates.  Those in the high success rate condition rated skill as having more to do 
with their performance than those with a low success rate, t(201)=3.79, p<.001. Conversely, 
those with a high success rate rated chance as having less to do with their performance than those 
with a low success rate, t(201)=-2.19, p<.05. This is consistent with pervasive findings of self-
serving bias in the literature (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). While we found results that went 
along with our predictions in general, it seems a bit surprising that average scores on both scales 
 were small to moderate.  Thus, part
played an especially large role in performance.
Figure 9. Overall differences in attributions of skill and chance between success rate (SR) 
groups. The transformed average score refers to the average of the scores on the corresponding 
final scale items. The average scores were than transformed so that all ratings went from 0 
(played no role) to 3 (played a significant role).  
 To explore whether attributions of skill and chance 
taking, the relationship between skill 
risk taking, were studied within each success rate. This all
matched our hot hand related predictions
rate, higher skill ratings should be associated with more risks being taken
continued successes. For those with a low success rate, higher skill 
with less risks being taken given an expectation of continued failures
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icipants in neither condition seemed to think 
 
Standard error bars are displayed.
were specifically related to risk 
ratings and risk taking, as well as chance/luck 
owed for a test of how well our 
. If our results fit, then for those with a high success 
 given an expectation of 
ratings should be associated 
. Correlations were 
skill or chance 
 
 
ratings and 
results 
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computed to look at these possible relationships. The risk taking dependent variable consisted of 
the average of the last 2 win/loss combo selections in the Calibration Stage. 
 No significant associations were found between attributions of skill/chance and risk 
taking, in either condition. The skill rating and risk taking correlation was not significant in 
either the high success rate, r(99)=.05, n.s., or the low success rate, r(100)=-.03, n.s., groups. 
There was also no significant association between chance/luck ratings and risk taking for the 
high success rate, r(99)=-.06, n.s., and the low success rate, r(100)=-.02, n.s., groups. Since we 
had sufficient power to detect a relationship and there were no issues of variability in attribution 
scores or risk taking, these results go against hot hand related predictions. 
Summary 
 To summarize, participants were sensitive to their success rate. Their risk preferences 
patterns looked similar to experience-based paradigm predictions overall, such that those with a 
high success rate took more risks than those with a low success rate. However, when calibration 
was tested, high success rate participants ended the experiment by choosing win/loss combos less 
risky than their optimal, while low success rate participants ended by choosing combos more 
risky than their optimal. In addition, low success rate participants had a slight tendency to 
increase their risk taking early on, and only with additional experience to drop back down to a 
lower level of risk. 
Overall attributions of skill and chance were in accordance with predictions of a self-
serving bias. Those with a high success rate believed skill to be more at play than chance, 
whereas skill and chance were seen as having a similar role by low success rate participants. 
When the association between the attributions and risk taking was analyzed, however, hot hand 
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related predictions were not confirmed, and beliefs about skill and chance did not seem to be 
related to risk taking behavior. 
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Discussion 
 
 This study examined how risk preferences are influenced by one’s experienced success 
rate in an uncertain environment, using a task that captured characteristics of many real world 
environments. The results suggest that people are sensitive to their success rate, in that 
participants changed their risk taking behavior after only a few trials. High success rate 
participants responded in the expected direction and started taking more risks after a few trials. 
Low success rate participants initially started taking more risks despite their low success rate, but 
still chose safer win/loss combos compared to high success rate participants. As the trials 
progressed, those who had a high success rate began taking on more risk and those with a low 
success rate gradually began taking fewer risks. 
Comparisons to Experience-Based Paradigms 
 We had expected that the above risk preference pattern would be similar to the typical 
pattern found when using experience-based paradigms. This was because experience-based 
paradigms, similar to our experiment, rely on the participant experiencing probability through a 
series of events rather than through a numeric description as in description-based paradigms. The 
usual risk preference pattern predicted by experience-based paradigms is risk seeking in the 
positive domain, or with a high success rate, and risk aversion in the negative domain, or with a 
low success rate. Results supported experience-based paradigm predictions. Those with a high 
success rate took more risks relative to those with a low success rate, even when a shift towards 
risk seeking was found for both success rate groups in the ‘Initial Skill’ stage.  
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In the ‘Initial Skill’ stage, the shift towards risk seeking was expected for those with a 
high success rate only. Those with a low success rate may have initially started to take risks in 
this stage because they expected their skill to get better as they played more puzzles. Skill is 
often thought of as working in one direction; developing skill through effort would typically be 
expected to improve performance, not hurt it (e.g., Schneider, 2001). However, by the end of the 
initial stage, low success rate participants took fewer risks than those with a high success rate, 
and this pattern gradually continued in the ‘Calibration’ stage, as expected from experience-
based paradigm predictions. This might have been because after more experiences of doing 
poorly, low success rate participants realized they were not improving and adjusted their risk 
taking behavior accordingly. 
 To more rigorously test whether our results were in line with experience-based paradigm 
predictions about underweighting of rare events, we examined how well people calibrated their 
performance to their success rate. Those who had a high success rate were expected to take on 
more risk relative to their optimal level by the end because they would underestimate the rare 
event of doing poorly. Alternatively, those with a low success rate were expected to take on less 
risk relative to their optimal level by the end, as they would underestimate the rare event of doing 
well. Our results demonstrate that participants moved in the direction towards their optimal level 
of risk, but were just shy of reaching it. Those with a high success rate took on less risk relative 
to their optimal, and those with a low success rate took on more risk relative to their optimal. 
These tendencies were not consistent with experience-based paradigm predictions overall.  
Their tendencies could be seen as more in line with description-based paradigm 
predictions, suggesting the possible overweighting of rare events. We did not expect calibration 
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results to be similar to description-based paradigm predictions because probabilities were not 
made explicit in the puzzle task.  Thus, the reason for the overweighting of rare events, if that is 
what is happening, is unclear. Both paradigms rely on an explanation focused on the process of 
underweighting or overweighting of rare events.  Given the partial compatibility of our results 
with both paradigms, a conflict arises suggesting that processes other than (and possibly in 
addition to) the weighting of rare events may influence risk taking tendencies in uncertain 
environments.  
 One possibility is that the calibration results might be due to an affinity for the status quo. 
The status quo effect (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) refers to the decision to do nothing 
and maintain a current or previous position. It is a bias when people more often choose to stick 
with the status quo alternative than another alternative. In terms of the puzzle task, the status quo 
would be similar to choosing the same win/loss combo throughout the experiment in order to 
maintain the current position. The status quo bias could explain why participants as a group 
eventually stuck with choosing more intermediate win/loss combos, leading to a middling effect 
by the end of the experiment. Once participants experienced their success rate in the initial trials 
and changed their risk taking accordingly, the cost of choosing another alternative (i.e., a 
different win/loss combo) besides what they had already been choosing might not have seemed 
worth it. It might not have been worth it to participants because they were aware that the 
experiment involved an element of uncertainty, and the perceived potential cost of trying out a 
different win/loss combo might have outweighed any potential benefit to their performance. 
Another possibility is that the calibration results might be due to an anchoring and 
adjustment strategy used by participants. Anchoring and adjustment is one of three classic 
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heuristics proposed by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) in which an initial reference point (i.e., 
anchor) is adopted, insufficient adjustments are made, and the resulting judgment is often biased 
towards the anchor (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Furnham & Boo, 2011). In terms of 
calibration, this would mean that participants could have anchored onto their initial win/loss 
combo selection. Initial selections were fairly conservative suggesting a typical anchor that 
avoided extremes and was slightly risk averse relative to the middle of the scale. Although 
participants as a group made adjustments in the appropriate direction, they might have made 
insufficient adjustments and stayed closer to intermediate win/loss combos, thus leading to a 
middling effect by the end of the experiment. It is interesting to note that since there were no 
significant effects of instruction order on risk taking, participants most likely were not adopting 
either of the (extreme) win/loss combo examples from the instructions as their starting anchors, 
and instead tended to use an intermediate but relatively cautious starting point. 
The status quo bias and an anchoring and adjustment strategy both suggest that, after 
participants as a group initially changed their risk taking in the appropriate direction, their 
subsequent adjustments in risk taking were small. This led them to just miss reaching their 
optimal level of risk (as a group). According to the status quo bias, small adjustments were made 
because participants as a group preferred maintaining their current level of risk instead of 
choosing different win/loss combos. An anchoring and adjustment strategy suggests that small 
adjustments were made because participants anchored on to their initial intermediate win/loss 
combo selections. Both suggest a tendency to adjust conservatively relative to some default. This 
tendency might be especially common in situations of uncertainty.  
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The tendency to adjust conservatively may also be because participants did not feel that 
skill did not play a large role in performance overall. Since skill was not seen as having an 
overwhelming part in determining performance, participants may have not felt the need to go to 
the extremes. High success rate participants may not have thought that skill was playing a major 
role but they could recognize that they were doing well, so they increased the risks taken to a 
certain point but ended up below the optimal. Low success rate participants may also not have 
thought that skill was a crucial factor but they could recognize that they were doing poorly, so 
they decreased their risks taken to a certain point and ended up above the optimal. It is also 
possible that more time spent playing the puzzles and a stronger skill manipulation was 
necessary in order for participants to reach their optimal level. 
Evidence for experience-based paradigms is mixed. We found similar risk preference 
patterns overall, but calibration results suggest that something else might be driving how 
participants ability to approach an optimal level of risk besides or in addition to the weighting of 
rare events. The tendency to adjust conservatively, based on a conservative win/loss combo 
anchor or a preference for maintaining the current position, may have led to the middling effect 
by the end of the experiment. Furthermore, introducing the element of skill may have changed 
how participants approached decisions involving risk in ways not predicted by experience-based 
paradigms. 
Potential for Individual Differences 
Generally, it seems that participants started off with a conservative but intermediate 
anchor, made adjustments as they experienced their success rate, and gradually leveled off in 
terms of the amount of risk they were willing to take on. While it is important to understand this 
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group behavior, there were also noticeable individual differences. Variations were possible in the 
starting anchor, and how often and when each participant fluctuated in their risk taking from trial 
to trial. For instance, individuals differed in how well they calibrated their success to their 
environment. Some individuals were better or worse at calibrating than others. Out of those who 
had a high success rate, just over half took fewer risks in the end compared to their optimal level 
of risk. The remaining participants either took on more risk in the end compared to their optimal, 
or took on the optimal amount of risk. Out of those who had a low success rate, more than half 
took on more risk in the end compared to their optimal. The remaining participants either took on 
fewer risks in the end compared to their optimal, or took on the optimal amount of risk. 
Exploring individual differences further will help to illuminate why people within success rate 
groups differed in their risk taking, as well as why some people were more or less calibrated.  
This thesis attempted to explore how motivational focus differed as a function of success 
rate and not in terms of individual differences. Exploratory evidence for motivational focus 
differences between groups was not found in the puzzle task. The success/failure focus scale was 
unreliable, suggesting that simply transforming items from a previous promotion/prevention 
scale was not enough to show whether participants as a group were motivated towards the 
positive or away from the negative. The critical item used to explore if there were any 
differences in motivational focus between success rate groups also did not support the idea that 
those with a high success rate would approach the positive and those with a low success rate 
would avoid the negative. It is possible then that the experience of success rate was not enough 
to push people towards focusing on the positive or avoiding the negative, but that we may have 
found significant individual differences in motivational focus if we had measured them. A 
person’s tendency to approach the positive or avoid the negative might influence how they used 
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their successes and failures to inform them of how much risk to take on. An example of a 
relevant theory is SP/A theory (e.g., Lopes, 1983), which suggests that there is a dispositional 
factor of being more security or potential focused, and this might lead one person to take a risk 
and another to play it safe, even if they had the same success rate. 
Another individual difference to be explored in future research is beliefs about luck. In a 
situation that involves an element of chance, how that chance element is believed to work either 
for or against someone might drive risk taking. Darke and Freedman (1997) constructed the 
Belief in Good Luck (BIGL) scale, which assesses individual differences with respect to beliefs 
about luck. People can maintain the view that luck is fairly stable and influences outcomes in 
their favor. For example, if people are more disposed to view chance as working in their favor, 
then they might expect their likelihood of succeeding to increase as a result of this, and would be 
more risk seeking than people who did not have this inclination. Others may believe that luck is 
less stable and more random, and would then have different risk preference patterns. This thesis 
addressed beliefs about chance and luck, but only specific to the task environment. Studying how 
beliefs about luck differ as a function of individuals remains to be explored.  A variety of other 
individual differences, including both cognitive and motivational factors, might be worth 
exploring. 
The Role of Beliefs about Skill and Chance 
This thesis expanded upon the experience-based paradigm by including elements of both 
skill and chance. The puzzle task did not include real skill, but the illusion of skill. This was of 
greater interest because in real world situations, we often do not know how much skill we have 
or how much of an influence it has on outcomes. People then must rely on success rate 
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information to help them figure out how much skill they have and how much of a role it plays in 
outcomes. Therefore, we were interested in beliefs about skill and chance.  
Results suggest that participants may have a relatively sophisticated understanding of 
events in that they infer that both skill and chance are factors in their performance. In both the 
high and low success rate conditions, participants acknowledged that both were likely to play a 
role in their outcomes. It seems likely that people are aware of the trade-off between skill and 
chance, even though they cannot directly differentiate the two based on experience. 
 Whether or not results were consistent with the expectation regarding the continuation of 
streaks in the hot hand (e.g., Laplace, 1951) or gambler’s fallacy (e.g., Gilovich, Vallone, 
Tversky, 1985) research is a more complicated issue. When looking at the association between 
skill and risk taking for each success rate, there were no significant relationships. Higher skill 
ratings were not associated with taking more risks for high success rate participants, or fewer 
risks for low success rate participants. 
This conflicts with the literature, which suggests that how success rate is interpreted is 
related to beliefs about the role of skill and chance (e.g., Ayton & Fisher, 2004; Burns & Corpus, 
2004), and that streaks are expected to continue when skill is involved. When skill is involved, 
streaks of doing well were expected to be related to taking more risks and streaks of doing poorly 
were expected to be related to taking fewer risks. However, it is possible that participants did not 
feel like they had enough skill to depend on it when deciding whether or not to take risks. In 
essence, participants might not have felt that their hand was “hot” enough. Focusing on how 
much one believes skill to be at play, or how much success is needed to feel confident that 
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successes will continue, may be as important as whether or not one believes skill to be a factor at 
all.  
There was no evidence for a relationship between skill ratings and risk taking within each 
success rate group. A more precise test of hot hand predictions would include an evaluation of 
the relationship between risk taking behavior and actually experienced streaks of a particular 
outcome, within each success rate group. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 Real world situations often appear to involve both skill and chance. In these situations, 
we often do not know exactly how much skill we have, or how big or small a role it plays in 
determining outcomes. Success rate information can then become very useful in gauging the role 
of skill and chance in determining outcomes. When in an environment that appears to involve 
skill and chance, people seem to be sensitive to and use their success rate when making risky 
decisions. Doing well and having a high success rate leads to taking more risks in the puzzle 
task. Doing poorly and having a low success rate leads to taking fewer risks in the puzzle task, 
once an expectation that performance will improve as time passes is disconfirmed. Future studies 
are needed to better understand what happens when uncertain situations have an element of skill 
involved. 
 This thesis addressed how using a success rate in lieu of exact probability information 
influenced risk taking, as well as the role of skill and chance in interpreting success rate 
information. This thesis did not address what happens when success rate changes, or when 
evidence for skill and chance changes. Real world environments not only typically lack exact 
information regarding probabilities and the amount of skill and chance involved, but this 
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information typically does not always remain constant. There can be more or less uncertainty in 
the environment, and one can attempt to improve their skill or may face situations that reduce 
their skill. These factors can change one at a time, or in tandem. If we know that people seem to 
be sensitive to and use their success rate when making decisions in a situation where they are 
experiencing a constant success rate, they may react differently when their experience changes in 
these various ways. Answering this question is a likely next step for better understanding how 
people respond to risk in real world environments that involve elements of both skill and chance. 
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